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VOLUME X MARCH, 1932 NUMBER 2
THE TAXATION OF CHAIN STORES
HAROLD HUGHES'
C HAIN store interests recently suffered an unexpected
repercussion as a result of two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.2 In these decisions the Supreme
Court upheld anti-chain store legislation in the states
of Indiana and North Carolina, and the natural effect
will probably be the enactment by every state of similar
anti-chain store legislation which is apparently arbitrary
and discriminatory.
By the provisions of the Indiana statute3 every person,
firm, corporation, association, or copartnership operat-
ing one or more stores within the state under the same
general management, supervision or ownership is sub-
ject to a graduated license tax. These are as follows:
First, upon one store, the license fee shall be three dollars
for each such store; second, upon two stores or more,
but not exceeding five stores, the annual license fee shall
be ten dollars for each such additional store; third, upon
each store in excess of five but not to exceed ten, the
annual license fee shall be fifteen dollars for each such
additional store; fourth, upon each store in excess of
ten, but not to exceed twenty, the annual license fee shall
be twenty dollars for each such additional store; fifth,
upon each store in excess of twenty, the annual license
1 Member Illinois Bar; Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
2 State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana v. Jack-
son, 283 U. S. 527; Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. et al. v. Maxwell,
etc., 52 S. Ct. 26.
3 Indiana Laws of 1929, Ch. 207.
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fee shall be twenty-five dollars for each such additional
store.
The North Carolina act 4 requires everyone, except
automobile and motorcycle dealers and owners of service
stations, who operates two or more retail stores, to pay
an annual license tax of fifty dollars for each store in
excess of one.
That the power of taxation is necessary to the exist-
ence of state governments is unquestioned; and while
the state's power of taxation must not be so exercised
as to deny to any the equal protection of the laws, this
limitation still permits a wide legislative discretion in
classifying business, occupations, or trades for tax pur-
poses. The principle that a state may not deny to any
person the equal protection of the laws does not mean
that equal taxation is required, nor does it prevent spe-
cial forms of regulation or taxation through an excise or
license tax." The Supreme Court of the United States
has also decided that a statute which discriminates in
favor of a particular class is not arbitrary provided the
discrimination is based on some reasonable distinction.6
Such a statute will be upheld if any reasonable considera-
tion will support it.7 In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Company v..McGuire,s the court said:
Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based
on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired result, whether, in short, the legislative discretion
within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular
manner, are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the earnest conflict of serious opinion does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance.
The majority of the Supreme Court 9 in the Jackson
case seem to take this attitude in regard to the power
4 Laws of North Carolina, 1929, Revenue Act, Ch. 345.
5Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; South-
western Oil Co. v. State of Texas, 217 U. S. 114; Brown-Forman Co.
v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563.
6 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89.
7 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342; Quong Wing v.
Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59.
8 219 U. S. 549.
9Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Roberts, Stone, Holmes and
Brandeis.
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of a state to tax, although the court in the McGuire case
had in mind the power of a state to interfere with free-
dom of contract.
It is interesting to note the differences or advantages
peculiar to the chain stores which the majority of the
Supreme Court rely upon to justify the classification
under the Indiana statute. According to the evidence
these advantages were as follows: First, chains ordi-
narily buy in large quantities. But through the medium
of co-operative purchasing associations this advantage
is likewise enjoyed by independent proprietors of single
stores; hence it is not peculiar to the chain store. Sec-
ond, they buy for cash and obtain the advantage of a
discount. The evidence did not indicate how or why this
so-called chain store advantage was not open to inde-
pendent dealers. It does not appear that this is a real
difference between chains and independents. Third,
chains, skilled in buying, are able to avoid overbuying,
and yet to keep the stores stocked with products suitable
in size, style and quality for the neighborhood customers
who patronize them. Is it true that this advantage is
peculiar to the chains and is closed to independent mer-
chants? If independent merchants fail to use skill in
buying, is their lack of ability corrected by penalizing
those who do use it? Fourth, chains obtain cheaper, yet
superior advertising. What prevents the independent
from arranging his store in the attractive manner pecu-
liar to the chain stores? Would it not be more just to
encourage economy and modern methods by taxing
equally the efficient and the inefficient? Fifth, chains
have superior management and method. Again, it is
strange that the chain stores have a monopoly on intelli-
gent management and good service. Additional advan-
tages claimed to be peculiar to chain stores are the fol-
lowing: Warehousing of goods and distributing from a
single warehouse to numerous stores; an abundant sup-
ply of capital, whereby advantage may be taken of oppor-
tunities for the establishment of new units; a pricing
and sales policy resulting in prices slightly lower on -the
part of the chain stores as compared with single stores;
a greater turn-over, and a constant analysis of the turn-
over to ascertain relative profits on varying items;
standardization in the matter of display and store man-
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agement. Thus, it is to be observed that every point of
difference said to exist between the chain stores and in-
dependent stores seems open to adoption by the inde-
pendents. In fact, because of the existence of the
Independent Grocers' Alliance in Indiana, these advan-
tages were not at all peculiar to chain stores but were
likewise enjoyed by many independents. The Indiana
statute, consequently, indicates a plain attempt on the
part of the legislature to discriminate against owners
of more than one store and to favor owners of a single
store.
It may well be asked, "Who will shoulder this added
burden imposed on the chain stores?" According to
reliable authority1° license taxes as well as gross receipts
taxes are easily shifted to the public. Hence, from the
point of view of the general public, the resultant higher
cost of necessities is an effect which perhaps will over-
balance any advantages to be derived from the increased
revenue.
Since the Indiana statute was upheld as a revenue
measure and was not justified under the police power
of the state, and since the "substantial difference" relied
upon by the majority of the Court in the Jackson case
consisted merely in carrying on business under many
roofs as compared to carrying on business under one
roof, it would be interesting if another state were to
enact a statute imposing a tax on chain stores, grading
the tax upward in the case of chains operating fewer
stores, and taxing owners of single stores the highest
tax per unit of all the stores being taxed.
Under the decision of State Tax Commissioners of
Indiana v. Jackson, the Supreme Court could not deny
a difference existed between chains and unit stores, and,
if the statute were a revenue measure the Supreme Court
could not inquire into the reason for the statute. Such a
classification would be identical with that in the Indiana
statute except that the chains would have the advantage.
It is therefore necessary for W. K. Henderson of Shreve-
port, Louisiana, leader of independent merchants' asso-
10 E. R. A. Seligman, The Shifting and Incidence of Taxation (2d Ed.,
1899), pp. 269-294.
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ciations and other independents to embrace this new
doctrine handed down in the Jackson case with extreme
care as it may prove to be a two-edged sword.
It is to be hoped that income taxes will not be made
to depend on the number of sources from which income
is derived. If the doctrine of the Jackson case were to
be carried over to the field of income taxation we would
find John Jones, with an income of four thousand dollars
a year derived from ten stores or units, paying an in-
come tax higher than that paid by William Smith who
operates but one store, yet has an income of a million
dollars a year. According to the Jackson case, the fee
is made to depend upon the number of sources or units
regardless of such distinguishing features as kind, value,
size, location, amount invested, amount or character of
business done, or the income derived therefrom.
That other states will follow the example set by Indi-
ana is unquestioned.1' In 1929 and 1930, some eighty-
four anti-chain store tax measures were introduced in
the various state legislatures. Of those measures, six
eventually became either license or sales tax laws. Fur-
thermore, over one hundred chain tax bills of various
sorts were introduced in the legislatures of forty-four
states during the sessions of 1931,12 and in Alabama
1 3
and Florida 4 the measures became laws. Of the states
recently in session a chain store bill was introduced in
Tennessee,' 5 while such legislation has been approved in
Arizona 6 and Wisconsin.
1 7
The Arizona and Wisconsin chain store laws are mod-
eled after the Indiana act, the fees in Arizona ranging
from five dollars on each store in excess of one, but not
exceeding five, to twenty-five dollars on each store in
excess of twenty, while the Wisconsin fees range from
ten dollars on two to five stores, to fifty dollars on each
store in excess of twenty.
1117 Va. Law Rev. 313.
12 The Tax Magazine, July; 1931, p. 261.
's Laws of 1931, Act 369.
14 Laws of 1931, House Bill No. 8-X.
15 H. B. 138 and S. B. 7.
16 H. B. 13, approved January 9, 1932.
17 A 35-X became law February 6, 1932.
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Three anti-chain store bills have also been introduced
at the special session of the Illinois legislature. 8 A 1931
bill called for the payment of an annual license fee of one
thousand dollars on each store of a chain after the first
three. What effect will this bill have on the chain store
business if it is enacted into law? Taking the Kroger
Grocery and Baking Company units in Illinois as an
example, we find that this company operates 633 stores
in Illinois. These stores have currently averaged annu-
ally about fifty thousand dollars per store in gross sales.
The profit on sales, currently earned, amounts to about
2 per cent, or one thousand dollars, which equals the tax
the Illinois bill would impose on each store, thus leaving
nothing for the Kroger Company for return on the
investment. 19
As a result of such legislation, the Supreme Court of
the United States will no doubt soon be called upon to
determine what is confiscation. Apparently, at the pres-
ent time, a state has the power to discriminate between
persons engaged in the same occupation even though the
basis of classification used is wholly immaterial either
from an economic or social point of view. Or, to put it in
another way, states may make any classifications they
choose, based on any difference, however slight, and still
comply with the requirement calling for the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Such a rule is not satisfactory, how-
ever, and it is to be regretted that the court did not see
fit to adhere to the fair rule of equal protection of the
laws for all persons following identical occupations.
It is submitted that the decision in Quaker City Cab
Company v. Pennsylvania" was controlling and should
have been followed in the Jackson case. The former
case arose as the result of a Pennsylvania statute which
imposed a tax on the gross receipts of a corporation
engaged in the general taxicab business. The statute
did not impose a like tax on the gross receipts of indi-
viduals and partnerships similarly engaged. It was
claimed that there were advantages peculiar to the cor-
porate form of business which were not at the disposal
Is H. B. 44-X, H. B. 52-X and S. B. 70-X.
19 Chain Store Magazine, June 1931, p. 9.
20 277 U. S. 389.
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of individuals and partnerships. Hence the facts and the
question therein presented were not unlike those involved
in Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson. The court,
in the Pennsylvania case, decided that the statute was
unconstitutional as a denial to the corporation of the
equal protection of the laws. The state could not place
corporations engaged in the general taxicab business in
one class and at the same time place individuals and
partnerships engaged in an identical business in a dif-
ferent class for tax purposes.
In a Kentucky decision,21 it was held that a license tax
was unconstitutional which attempted to impose a higher
tax upon cash and carry grocery stores than upon other
grocery stores. In Keystone Grocery and Tea Company
v. Huster,22 the Maryland court was of the opinion that
there were no essential characteristics, distinguishing
chain stores from stores operated by independent mer-
chants, which would justify a separate classification of
chain stores for the purpose of taxation. This decision,
incidentally, doomed the Maryland statute which at-
tempted to limit, on the monopoly basis, the operation
by one person, firm, association, or corporation of more
than five mercantile establishments in a chain.23
In Louis K. Liggett Company v. Baldridge,24 another
type of anti-chain store legislation-the policy regulation
of chain drug stores-was held unconstitutional. The
Pennsylvania statute involved in this case was condemned
by Owen Roberts, counsel for the Liggett Company, who
also represented the Quaker City Cab Company in the
suit already discussed.25 Since then, Mr. Roberts, as a
member of our Supreme Court, has apparently changed
his mind about these Pennsylvania statutes, for although
the Indiana statute was treated as a revenue measure
the rule is that whether the license is imposed as an
exercise of the police power or as an exercise of the
21 City of Danville et al. v. The Quaker Maid, Inc., 211 Ky. 677.
22 Allegheny County Circuit Court, No. 10922, Equity case (unre-
ported, 1927).
23 Laws of Maryland, 1927, Ch. 554, sec. 1.
24 278 U. S. 105.
25 See footnote 22, supra.
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taxing power, arbitrary discrimination is improper. 2
Actually the Indiana law was simply an attempt to exer-
cise the police power of the state in a manner that would
favor one group of taxpayers and discriminate against
another group without any social interest or proper
classification to uphold it as an exercise of this power.
In F. W. Woolworth Company et al. v. Harrison,
27
the constitutionality of a Georgia statute,28 which im-
posed a license tax of fifty dollars upon each store when
more than five stores were operated as a chain, was
questioned. The case had been appealed from a decision
of the Superior Court of Fulton County. The Supreme
Court of Georgia held the statute was unconstitutional,
reversing the decision of the lower court.
The Indiana act itself had been held unconstitutional by
three judges of a Federal statutory court of the Southern
Indiana District, Indianapolis Division. 29  It was this
decision, which was unanimous, from which the State
Tax Commissioners of Indiana appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. 0
Again, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi,31 an order granted an
interlocutory injunction restraining the enforcement of
the Mississippi chain store tax.32  The Mississippi act
imposed a tax of one-fourth of 1 per cent, additional,
upon the gross income of all stores of persons operating
more than five retail stores selling tangible property.
The order of the United States District Court was made
prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in the Indiana case.3 3  No opinion was rendered by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi in the Penny Stores case, and on appeal to
26 Commonwealth v. Payne Medicine Company, 138 Ky. 164; Kansas
City Southern Railway Company v. Road Improvement District No. 6,
256 U. S. 658.
27 172 Ga. 179; see also note 55 infra.
28 Georgia General Revenue Act, 1929, par. 109.
29 Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana et al.,
38 Fed. (2d) 652.
30 See footnote 2 supra.
31 Penny Stores, Inc., v. Mitchell et al. (Sept. 30, 1930).
32 Acts of Mississippi, 1930, Art. 1, Ch. 90, secs. 2-c, 11, 13.
A3 State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527.
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the United States Supreme Court the only question pre-
sented was whether the District Court abused its discre-
tion in granting an injunction until the case could be
heard upon its merits. As no abuse of discretion was
shown the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
order on October 26, 1931.3
4
In South Carolina, the rule laid down by the statutory
United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana was followed.3 5  Further procedure by the
Tax Commission of South Carolina was suspended until
the United States Supreme Court ruled on the petition
for a rehearing of the Indiana case. On October 12,
1931, the Court denied this petition, which claimed that
the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioners v.
Jackson did not place any limitation on the power of a
state to increase the amount of taxation on chain stores
to an oppressive extent, and to the point of destruction.
In North Carolina a chain store bill, 36 imposing an
annual license tax of $50 upon each retail store in excess
of one, was upheld by the Supreme Court of the state.37
The North Carolina Supreme Court had previously held
unconstitutional an earlier statute which imposed a
license tax upon each retail store operated by a person
who controlled six or more stores.38 It is rather difficult
to reconcile the two North Carolina decisions. The
United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed the
judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the North Carolina 1929
chain store act.
3 9
Virginia's anti-chain store law has also met with favor
in the courts. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia recently upheld" the act
which imposes a graduated and separate merchants'
34 Mitchell v. Penny Stores, Inc., 76 L. Ed. 32.
35 Southern Grocery Stores v. South Carolina Tax Commissioners,
United States District Court, South Carolina; hearing In this case
to be held after January 12, 1932.
36 Laws of North Carolina, 1929, Ch. 345.
37 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433.
38 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145.
39 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 52 S. Ct. 26.
40 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Morrisett et al., 52 S. Ct. 39.
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license tax, measured by the amount of purchases, on all
distributing houses.4 1  In a per curiam judgment the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
United States District Court42 and cited the Indiana
case in support of the judgment.
Under the Kentucky anti-chain store act,43 the tax
is measured by the volume of gross retail sales of all
stores. The tax rates are as follows:
1. One-twentieth of 1 per cent of gross sales of $400,000 or
less.
2. Two-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales over
$400,000 but not over $500,000.
3. Five-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales over
$500,000 but not over $600,000.
4. Eight-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales over
$600,000 but not over $700,000.
5. Eleven-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales over
$700,000 but not over $800,000.
6. Fourteen-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales
over $800,000 but not over $900,000.
7. Seventeen-twentieths of 1 per cent of excess of gross sales
over $900,000 but not over $1,000,000.
8. One per cent of excess gross sales over $1,000,000.
This statute was declared valid by a Circuit Court in
Kentucky.44 On appeal, however, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court 45 on
the grounds that the record did not show that plaintiff,
Moore, was one of the class of taxpayers who would have
to pay the gross sales tax if the law were upheld, and
that a decision on the constitutionality could not be had
unless a taxpayer who would have to pay the tax were
made a party. On a further appeal to the Kentucky
41 Laws of Virginia, 1925, Ch. 45, sec. 188, Virginia Tax Code.
42 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Morrisett, 52 S. Ct. 39.
43 Kentucky Laws, 1930, Ch. 149.
44 Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, Franklin Cir-
cuit Court, Kentucky (January 21, 1931).
45 Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 238 Ky. 243.
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Court of Appeals,40 after the D. T. Bohon Company was
made a party defendant, the court affirmed the judgment
of the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky which in a
new action 41 had again upheld the constitutionality of
the statute. An action seeking to restrain the enforce-
nuent of this gross retail sales tax law has been dismissed
for want of equitable jurisdiction.
48
The Florida anti-chain store act 49 imposes a license tax
upon all who operate one or more retail stores. The act
expressly exempts filling stations selling exclusively
gasoline and other petroleum products. The tax for
operating in any one county is as follows:
One store, five dollars.
Two to fifteen stores, ten dollars for each additional store.
Fifteen to thirty stores, fifteen dollars for each additional
store.
Thirty to fifty stores, twenty dollars for each additional store.
Fifty to seventy-five stores, thirty dollars for each additional
store.
More than seventy-five stores, forty dollars for each additional
store.
Where stores are operated in different counties, the
rate is as follows:
Two to fifteen stores, fifteen dollars for each additional store.
Fifteen to thirty stores, twenty dollars for each additional
store.
Thirty to fifty stores, thirty dollars for each additional store.
Fifty to seventy-five stores, forty dollars for each additional
store.
More than seventy-five stores, fifty dollars for each addi-
tional store.
Tvo chain store companies started a suit in a county
court of Florida against the State Comptroller to test
46 Moore v. State Board of Charities and Corrections, 239 Ky. 729.
47 Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky (April 17, 1931).
48 Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lewis et al., United States Dis-
trict Court, Eastern District of Kentucky, (November 6, 1931).
49 Florida Laws, 1931, House Bill No. 8-X.
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the constitutionality of this tax act.50 The county court
declined to grant an order enjoining the enforcement of
the law, and the plaintiffs thereupon appealed the case
to the Supreme Court of the state. The parties dismissed
the appeal to the Supreme Court shortly after it had been
filed in order to bring further proceedings before the
Leon County Circuit Court. Judge Love of the Leon
County Circuit Court on November 5, 1931, entered an
order granting leave to the complainants in the suit to
file an amended bill of complaint within seven days. The
record of the court two weeks later showed that no such
bill had been filed.
The Attorney-General of Florida is of the opinion that
dealers to whom a fertilizer manufacturer sells on con-
signment are outside the scope of this anti-chain store
law.
5 1
As far as the writer has been able to determine no de-
cision has yet been rendered concerning the constitution-
ality of the Alabama anti-chain store law.12  The Ala-
bama act taxes every person operating one or more
stores, either retail or wholesale, except a business prin-
cipally selling or distributing petroleum products. The
annual fee for operating one store is one dollar; for op-
erating two to five stores, ten dollars for each additional
store; for operating five to ten stores, fifteen dollars for
each additional store; for operating ten to twenty stores,
twenty-five dollars for each additional store; and for
operating more than twenty stores, seventy-five dollars
for each additional store.
To summarize, then, we find there are eleven states at
the present time with anti-chain store laws. These states
are, Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vir-
ginia and Wisconsin. The Georgia law has been held
50 Louis K. Liggett Co. and Winn E. Lovett Grocery Co. v. Amos
et al., Leon County Circuit Court, (Sept. 30, 1931).
51 Opinion of the Attorney General of Florida, November 10, 1931.
52 Alabama Laws, 1931, Act 369.
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unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court;53 and in
Mississippi and South Carolina, United States district
courts suspended proceedings to await the final action in
the Jackson case.5 4 Since the United States Supreme
Court on October 26, 1931, denied a petition for a rehear-
ing in the Jackson case, it seems likely that the United
States district courts in Mississippi and South Carolina
will uphold the statutes in those states.
It is alleged that chain stores force independent mer-
chants out of business, take money from the local com-
munity and send it to metropolitan centers, fail to sup-
port local institutions, tend to destroy individual initia-
tive, and bring about a monopoly of many businesses. On
the other hand it must be said that the public has received
the benefit of lower prices through chain stores. More-
over, individual initiative and incentive would suffer if
legislation tends to penalize expansion and natural
growth through efficient business management. But re-
gardless of the merit of these arguments, it is evident
that they are based on prejudice and not upon any such
distinction as should serve for tax classification.
On good authority it is claimed only 18 per cent of this
country's retail business is transacted by chains.5 5 If
this is a monopoly, the proper procedure for stopping it
is by means of the Clayton or Sherman Acts.
In conclusion the writer believes that the following
seven points should be considered in relation to the prob-
lem of anti-chain store legislation: 1. The decision in
the case of State Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jack-
son is out of line with the settled rule concerning classifi-
cation for the purpose of taxation56 2. States should
not be given the power to tax in any arbitrary manner
53 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 179.
5.4 283 U. S. 527.
55 W. B. Nichols, Chain Stores Fighting Unfair Taxes, Barron's,
Aug. 3, 1931, p. 18.
56 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389; Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412; Louisville Gas & E. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U. S. 32; Air-Way Electric Appliance Corporation v.
Day, 266 U. S. 71.
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they see fit to adopt, the only requirement being that
there must be some difference between one class of tax-
payers discriminated against and another class of tax-
payers favored by the statute.57  3. A statute whether
based on the taxing power of the state or the police power
must comply with the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.5" 4. The equal pro-
tection clause of the Constitution limits the power of any
state to tax.59  5. Statutes justified on the basis of the
power of a state to tax are invalid when discriminating
classifications therein contained are not based on differ-
ences of substance.60 6. Classification in revenue mea-
sures should be upheld only if it bears a real relationship
to public rather than private interests.61 7. Classifica-
tion is permitted in order that inequalities may be cor-
rected or avoided, but it should never be permitted to
create inequalities.
62
57 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 28'.
58 United States Constitution, Art. 14, sec. 1; Commonwealth v.
Payne Medicine Company, 138 Ky. 164.
59 Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232.
•60 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150.
61 American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; public
policy in this case warranted the particular classification as the
discrimination was intended to encourage agriculture generally.
62 Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134; County of Santa
Clara v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. 385.
